The Kurdish issue in Syria and the future of Turkey’s role in the Levant

By Yeghia Tashjian

With the disintegration of the Syrian state after 2011, the Kurds in northeast Syria became key players in shaping the country’s future. The recent agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) further consolidated their role. However, the future of the Syrian state remains uncertain amid the horrors of the massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast by radical Islamist factions affiliated with the new administration, Israel’s aspirations to encourage secessionist tendencies among the Druze community in Syria’s south, and Turkey’s strategic interests in Syria, which seem to collide with American-Israeli interests. 

This article will shed light on the agreement between Syria’s President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF General Mazloum Abdi and assess Turkey’s ambitions amid growing domestic and regional uncertainties shaping Syria’s future.

The Syrian Kurds and the significance of the Damascus-SDF agreement 

It is impressive how the Kurds, once an oppressed community in Syria, have become a crucial geopolitical actor in the country. The fight against ISIS and the previous regime’s withdrawal from northeast Syria consolidated Kurdish power in the region. During the emergence of ISIS, the Kurds were the only organized force that the United States could rely on to destroy the terrorist organization. Kurdish women showed their heroic resistance alongside men at the Battle of Kobane/Ain Arab, reminding many of the Battle of Stalingrad against the Nazi invasion. Russia militarily intervened in the Syrian war starting in September 2015 and indirectly facilitated talks between Damascus and the Kurds. 

However, these talks were not fruitful, as Damascus refused to grant the Kurds any political status or discuss federalism. This left the Syrian government isolated in the face of rising threats from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda. HTS led an attack on the Syrian army at the end of November 2024, and within ten days, HTS captured the capital, Damascus, with its allies amid the surprising collapse of the Syrian army. 

The election of U.S. President Donald Trump, Israel’s expansionist appetite, and domestic and regional uncertainty pushed both the new authorities in Damascus and the Kurds to reach a compromise deal. On March 10, 2025, a historic agreement was signed between SDF General Mazloum Abdi and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. While the agreement was signed only a few hours after massacres on Syria’s coast, negotiations began after the fall of the Assad regime and were facilitated by the US.

The agreement, which is expected to be implemented before the end of the year, includes the following:

1. Guaranteeing the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process and all state institutions based on competence, regardless of religious and ethnic background. 
2. Guaranteeing the Kurdish community’s right to citizenship and all constitutional rights as an indigenous community in Syria. 
3. Declaring a ceasefire on all Syrian territories. 
4. Integrating all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields. 
5. Ensuring the return and protection of all displaced Syrians.
6. Supporting the Syrian state in its fight against remnants of the Assad regime and all threats to its security and unity. 
7. Rejecting calls for division, hate speech and attempts to sow discord among all components of Syrian society. 

This agreement is an important step in guaranteeing Syria’s territorial integrity, preventing future sectarian massacres and (from the Kurdish perspective) minimizing the roles of Turkey, Islamists and radical elements in security institutions. 

However, the challenges are in the details and its implementation. Will the Kurds be able to return to Afrin after Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units took control of the region? Who will manage oil refineries in northeast Syria? Most importantly, how will Turkey and Israel react? Will Kurdish leaders agree to fight Israel? Will President al-Sharaa be able to prevent the SNA from attacking Kurdish-controlled villages? 

Turkey carefully observes the developments in Syria, as it wants to consolidate its political victory and prevent the establishment of a Kurdish ethno-political entity or the division of the country. 

Turkey’s objectives in Syria

Turkey’s actions, including military operations, base establishment and security force training, are driven by concerns about Kurdish autonomy. It is also important to consider Turkey’s role in Syria’s security restructuring, its stance on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its reaction to Israeli activities in southern Syria. 

Turkey’s objectives regarding Syrian Kurds 

Turkey is focused on diminishing the influence and strength of Kurdish forces, particularly those with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—such as the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—which Turkey has long considered a terrorist organization. Recently, there has been cautious optimism in Ankara regarding the U.S.-brokered agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government. However, Turkey remains wary and is closely monitoring how the agreement is implemented. Still, tensions remain high as Turkey continues military operations against PKK-linked groups in Syria. 

 According to Turkey’s DHA News Agency, a senior Turkish Defense Ministry official says that Ankara intends to examine “how the agreement reached [between Damascus and SDF] will be implemented and its reflections on the field.” “There is no change in our expectations for the termination of terrorist activities in Syria, the disarmament of terrorists and the expulsion of foreign terrorists from Syria,” added the Turkish official. 

Over the years, Turkey has undertaken several military operations in northern Syria to establish a 30-kilometer buffer zone along its southern border to prevent YPG expansion and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees in Turkey. These operations were greenlit by Russia, which aims to minimize U.S. influence in Syria. Turkey also aims to dismantle the “Kurdish-led autonomous region” in northeastern Syria and block potential calls for Kurdish self-rule, fearing that such developments could fuel separatist sentiments among Kurds within Turkey.

Turkey’s views on Kurdish integration in Syria 

On February 27, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) co-founder Abdullah Ocalan called for a ceasefire, disarmament and dissolution of the PKK from his prison cell. Some analysts have linked the signing of the Damascus-SDF agreement to this call. However, the SDF commented that while it welcomed the “historic call to drop the decades-long armed struggle against the Turkish state,” the PKK is not related to Kurdish factions in Syria. Turkey has been cautious in its response, and this caution extends to the potential integration of Kurdish forces into Syria’s state institutions. 

Ankara is now watching closely to see how this agreement plays out—which aligns with Turkey’s long-standing goal of preventing an autonomous Kurdish state in northeastern Syria. However, Ankara’s primary concern remains the expulsion of PKK forces within the SDF. Recent diplomatic overtures suggest that Turkey is keen to monitor developments and ensure its security interests are protected.

The establishment of military bases in Syria 

To maintain its long-term goals in Syria, Turkey has set up a series of military bases in northern Syria. These installations vary in type, from small observation posts to larger operational bases, which are equipped with artillery, air defense systems and surveillance equipment. Key bases are located in Afrin, Al-Bab and Idlib, strategically positioned to monitor and counteract Kurdish forces. 

While Turkey previously denied reports that it intends to establish two new military bases in Syria, Türkiye newspaper, citing intelligence sources, reported, “Turkey will train the country’s [Syrian] army in two military bases it will establish in Syria.” According to this report, under a joint defense agreement Turkey will offer Syria support in case of a military attack. The proposed agreement “includes the establishment of Turkish military bases in the central desert region (Badiyah), with key installations at Palmyra and T4 airbase.” 

On March 17, the Turkish-affiliated Clash Report channel reported that Menagh airbase in northern Aleppo, which is undergoing maintenance, is being converted into a joint Turkish-Syrian airbase. These bases are intended for air defense, military action against Kurdish groups and the training of Syrian forces. As reported by the Media Line, such efforts assist Turkey in balancing the influence of other regional powers such as Iran and Russia, reinforcing its strategic role in the Middle East. 

Turkey’s role in training Syrian security forces 

These reports do not come as an unexpected development, since Turkey has actively provided training, logistical support and coordination to the SNA, which comprises various opposition groups. This training encompasses “military tactics, intelligence operations and administrative functions.” Ali Bakir, a professor at Qatar University and non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, argued that it is very probable that “the new Syrian administration will look to import Turkish defense equipment and technology, potentially even aspiring to adopt the Turkish model for building an indigenous defense industry.” 

Bakir added that the bases in the central desert region, Badiya, with the key installations at Palmyra and T4 (Althias) airbase “could serve as outposts for SIGINT-ELINT and forward deployments of UAVs for surveillance missions.” Referring to Signals intelligence (SIGINT)—the field of intelligence-gathering by interception of signals—Bakir argued that “Turkey can provide air defense coverage, electronic warfare-early warning-intelligence solutions for Syria either through a partnership or by installing such systems and training the Syria army to operate them.” Bakir emphasized that the priority would be rebuilding the Syrian army, since the navy and air force require “much higher know-how and differentiated skill sets built over a longer period.” 

Turkey’s perspective on HTS 

During the Syrian civil war, HTS (formerly known as the Nusra Front, affiliated with al-Qaida) emerged as a significant player in Syria’s northwest, particularly in Idlib province. Turkey’s position on HTS and its impact on Damascus is multifaceted. Turkey has engaged with HTS to stabilize regions under its control, balancing cooperation with exerting pressure to moderate HTS’ more extremist elements. Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict has granted it leverage over Damascus, especially concerning the integration of Kurdish forces and the restructuring of Syria’s security apparatus. High-level visits, such as those by Turkish officials to Damascus, highlight Turkey’s pivotal role in shaping Syria’s post-conflict trajectory. 

Turkey’s reaction to Israeli incursions in southern Syria 

Israel’s recent incursions into southern Syria, particularly the Golan Heights, and support for Druze communities have elicited reactions from Turkey. First, Turkey is wary that instability in the south could trigger a new wave of refugees and additional sectarian clashes. Turkey has expressed concern over Israel’s humanitarian aid to Syrian Druze, viewing it as a potential means of influencing the region’s demographics and politics. 

Second, Ankara has strategic calculations at stake. While Turkey monitors Israeli activities, it currently seeks to avoid direct confrontation, focusing instead on its primary objectives in northern Syria. Turkish defense expert Barin Kayaoglu drew a parallel to Turkey’s actions in Somalia, where Turkish officials have been working to rebuild state institutions and the military. He stated that Turkey should leverage “Syria as a strategic asset in countering Israel’s assertive posture, responding to potential U.S. troop withdrawals, and ensuring Syria’s political transition aligns with Turkey’s interests.” 

Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu of the Abu Dhabi-based Trends Research and Advisory added that Turkey’s objectives involve dismantling the ‘PKK-affiliated Kurdish forces,’ securing a maritime border agreement and integrating Syrian military priorities with Turkey’s regional strategy. If fulfilled, these objectives would strengthen Turkey’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean, including its approach to Cyprus via air and naval bases on the island. However, any significant shifts in Israeli policy could prompt a reassessment of Turkey’s stance. Amid rising threats from Israel to enforce a demilitarized zone in southern Syria, Turkey will find itself in a difficult situation in confronting Israel’s expansionist designs.

Conclusion 

Post-war state-building in Syria is impossible without the integration of Kurds into this process, requiring compromise from both Damascus and Kurdish leaders. The presence of the Kurds in Syrian public affairs will provide crucial checks on the influence of Islamists affiliated with the HTS and other forces. Syria’s future will also involve secular Kurds, who may be supported by other communities against the new Islamist administration. The unity and cooperation of these ideologies are important not only for state-building but also for thwarting Israel’s expansionist efforts and its support for separatist projects in the south of the country. However, Turkey’s role cannot be ignored when it comes to shaping Syria’s domestic politics.

Both Israel and Turkey are main players in Syria. While Israel seeks to fragment Syria to legitimize its military occupation of Syrian territories, Turkey’s priorities are to limit Kurdish autonomy, secure strategic regions and influence Syria’s political future. Its military presence, base establishment and training efforts are key to these goals. Meanwhile, Turkey’s dealings with HTS and the Syrian government highlight its growing role in Syria’s future.

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Yeghia Tashjian

Yeghia Tashjian is the Issam Fares Institute Public Policy and International Affairs-American University of Beirut’s Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator. He holds a master’s degree in Public Policy and International Affairs from the American University of Beirut and completed the “Strategic Leadership in Global Societal Security Program” at the Swedish Defense University in 2022. He earned his bachelor’s degree in political science from Haigazian University in 2013 and has worked in the university’s Armenian Diaspora Research Center between 2016-2017. Yeghia’s master’s thesis focused on China’s geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. Currently, Tashjian is engaged in research on the phenomenon of Turkish-Russian ‘co-opetition’ in the MENA+ Caucasus region and Russia’s involvement in the International North-South Transport Corridor. He contributes to various local and regional newspapers, has presented various topics from minority rights to regional security issues, and is a part-time instructor in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut.