The Washington Agreements: Prospects for the Internationalization of the Karabakh Conflict (Part III)

By Gevorg Ghukasyan, PhD in Political Sciences
Special Project Manager at Armenian National Committee – International

The most tangible provision of the August 8, 2025 Washington agreements concerned the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. On that same day, and on the basis of the political framework of the joint declaration signed by the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the presence of the U.S. President-but prior to its formal signing-the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a joint request to the OSCE for the termination of the Minsk Group’s processes and affiliated structures.
On September 1, the OSCE Secretariat announced that the OSCE Ministerial Council, with the consensus of its 57 participating states, had decided to dissolve the Minsk Group and its affiliated mechanisms. Only strictly administrative functions would continue until December 1, 2025, to finalize the transfer of property and equipment.

The Minsk Group was thus dissolved as a result of Azerbaijan’s long-standing demands and yet another concession by the Armenian authorities. Azerbaijan had begun pressing for its dissolution as early as September-October 2023, following the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh. Armenia’s agreement in this case, too, came under the threat or use of Azerbaijani force.

Formed in 1992, the OSCE (then CSCE) Minsk Group was intended to facilitate a political settlement of the conflict, thereby also ensuring the realization of the rights of the Armenians of Artsakh. Its mandate, clarified in 1995, explicitly envisioned the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of armed conflict. In essence, one of its primary goals was the protection of the rights and security of Artsakh Armenians. Azerbaijan’s military operations in 2020 and 2023, along with genocidal ethnic cleansing, further deepened the consequences of the conflict. Artsakh’s inhabitants continue to face systematic violations of their fundamental rights.
For this reason, neither the OSCE nor the wider international community can abandon their responsibilities. The conflict requires sustained international attention and mediation grounded in international law, justice, and diplomacy. Only through these principles can genuine and lasting peace in the region be achieved.
Although the Minsk Group format may have weakened over the years, the principles underpinning it-true multilateralism, inclusive dialogue, and international mediation-remain essential. Abandoning them, particularly in an era of global instability, signals that disputes are to be resolved by force rather than international order. This legitimization of force as an instrument of state policy will not bring stability; rather, it will perpetuate a cycle of violence in the region and further undermine the foundations of international law and diplomacy.

Thus, in yielding to Azerbaijani demands-arguably the only practical outcome of the Washington process-the dissolution of the Minsk Group underscores the urgent priority for organizations defending Armenian interests: the continued internationalization of the Karabakh issue. The matter must be kept firmly on the international agenda-parliamentary, executive, and multilateral-by all possible means. Since the Washington process offered no alternative international platform to replace the Minsk Group, the creation of such a forum must be treated as an immediate priority.

Actors

It is evident that Armenia’s current authorities will play no constructive role in the internationalization of the Karabakh issue. Therefore, it is crucial to identify organizations capable of undertaking this difficult work under unfavorable international conditions. Such actors exist both in Armenia and especially in the Diaspora.
Key among them are pan-Armenian organizations, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the international Armenian Cause (Hai Tahd) network, and traditional political parties for whom the conflict remains unresolved. The Armenian General Benevolent Union, while not political, has a significant educational and cultural role in preserving memory and resilience. Diaspora professional associations, foundations, and think tanks also form part of this network.

A particularly critical role belongs to Artsakh’s authorities and the “Committee on the Protection of the Fundamental Rights of the People of Artsakh,” created by the National Assembly of Artsakh in December 2023. Continuous support for these structures is vital to ensure the legitimate international representation of Artsakh Armenians’ demands.

1. International Judicial Platforms Cases must be pursued at the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Criminal Court. Pending proceedings should be continued, new cases added, and-after Armenia’s authorities withdrew certain inter-state claims-individual and group applications must be ensured. In this regard, significant work has already been undertaken by the Armenian Legal Center and the Armenian Center for International and Comparative Law.
   Of particular importance is the ICJ’s November 17, 2023 ruling on provisional measures, which obligates Azerbaijan to ensure the right of return and related rights for Artsakh Armenians.
2. International Organizations Following the dissolution of the Minsk Group, the primary arenas for pursuing the protection of Artsakh Armenians’ rights are the UN and its relevant bodies, above all the Human Rights Council, as well as the OSCE itself, which has a charter-based responsibility for such issues.
   The EU’s institutions-including the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council-are also crucial. The European Parliament’s consistent resolutions recognizing Artsakh Armenians’ rights, including the right of return, have influenced the EU’s executive stance, ensuring acknowledgment that the conflict is far from resolved.
3. International Human Rights Organizations Engagement with major NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Freedom House is essential. In this regard, the 2024 Freedom House report, “Why There Are No Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,” produced in collaboration with other international organizations, provides invaluable documentation of events from 2020-2023.
4. Media and Information Azerbaijan’s disinformation campaigns and the global media’s focus on “peace narratives” have hindered the spread of objective information from Armenia. Diaspora communities must cultivate foreign journalists interested in these issues and increase media activism, including organizing journalistic visits to Armenia.
5. Ecumenical Circles Religious institutions also play a role. The Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, the Catholicosate of Cilicia, and ecumenical bodies such as the World Council of Churches and the Conference of European Churches offer platforms to highlight cultural heritage, human rights, and security concerns without framing the conflict as religious. The May 2025 conference in Bern on religious freedom and the preservation of Armenian heritage in Artsakh is an example.
6. Individual States States remain the main actors in international relations. Work must continue with both traditionally friendly countries and those with more complex relations.
   Switzerland is particularly important, given its parliament’s binding resolution in spring 2025 obligating the government to convene an international forum on Artsakh Armenians’ right of return. The “Swiss Peace Initiative for Nagorno-Karabakh” could partially substitute for the dissolved Minsk Group. Broad international endorsement of this initiative is critical. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Canada, and others have also taken principled positions, which must be leveraged to encourage similar stances elsewhere. In the U.S., the State Department’s 2024 human rights report on Azerbaijan objectively documented extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and violations against Armenian prisoners of war. It also cited the UN Committee Against Torture’s findings and Freedom House’s report on Azerbaijan’s systematic strategy of ethnic cleansing between 2020-2023. This marks a significant acknowledgment at the executive level.
   In the UK, during OSCE discussions on the Minsk Group’s closure, the British representative emphasized that human rights remain unresolved in ongoing negotiations, reflecting London’s recognition of the issue’s incompleteness.

The dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group removes an established, multilateral framework without providing any alternative. In this unfavorable context, internationalization of the Karabakh conflict becomes not only urgent but existential. Through judicial proceedings, international organizations, human rights networks, media outreach, ecumenical platforms, and bilateral engagement with states, Armenian actors must ensure the issue remains firmly on the global agenda.
Only through such persistent and principled efforts can the rights of Artsakh Armenians-and the broader prospects for peace in the region-be safeguarded.

Read Part I

Read Part II