A reflection on Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service annual report

Horizon Weekly Newspaper

By Yeghia Tashjian

On January 23, 2025, Armenpress published an annual report by the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) of Armenia, titled “Annual Report on External Security Risks of the Republic of Armenia.” The report is divided into four chapters: “Political and Military Risks,” “Economic Risks and Opportunities,” “Information Risks” and “Combating International Terrorism.” Its main objective is to inform the public about the external security risks and threats to and around Armenia and to assess developments that took place between 2023 and 2024. It also forecasts some geopolitical and economic risks for Armenia in 2025.

Background of the FIS

In 2022, the National Assembly of Armenia announced its intention to create a foreign intelligence service based on assets within the intelligence department of Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) and the Armed Forces. The intelligence department of the NSS would be fully replaced by the FIS. The main task of the FIS, according to Secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan, is to collect information about the security situation around Armenia. Some opposition lawmakers criticized this step, arguing that fragmenting the NSS and establishing new intelligence departments would only weaken the existing structures. In October 2023, former Human Rights Ombudsman Kristine Grigoryan was appointed as the first director of the FIS.

Established on October 4, 2023, the agency states that its mission is to “forecast, prevent, counteract and protect against external threats to [the Armenian] state and nation by providing political decision-makers with reliable, credible and actionable intelligence as well as by conducting special activities.” Stressing the importance of serving the “democratic order of the Republic of Armenia” as a “politically impartial institution,” the agency aims to collect and analyze foreign intelligence and act to disrupt external threats. In its vision, it mentions that it aims to cooperate with other institutions and actors of the intelligence community in Armenia and “trustworthy international partners” to strengthen Armenia’s security, independence and sovereignty.

Content of the report 

The report states that, in recent years, the Russia-Ukraine war and developments in the Middle East have created threats for the South Caucasus. It forecasts that these tensions may continue and intensify in 2025.

In the chapter on “Political and Military Risks,” the report states, “Based on the analysis of various facts, information and phenomena, at the time of publishing of this report, the likelihood of a large-scale attack on Armenia by the Azerbaijani side is not assessed as high.” It adds that the absence of a peace agreement will always risk triggering escalations near the border. The agency continuously assesses whether aggressive rhetoric from Azerbaijan aims to “‘legitimize’ its intention to use force against Armenia. Among those narratives are so-called ‘Western Azerbaijan and Western Azerbaijanis,’ ‘Armenia’s militarization,’ ‘revanchism’ and the ‘Zangezur corridor.’”

The report also warns that new economic sanctions or targeted military strikes against Iran and escalations in Israel-Iran relations could create additional challenges for Armenia’s economy and complicate the situation in the South Caucasus. A similar concern is the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its spill-over effect on neighboring regions.

The section on “Military Alliances” argues, “CSTO’s incapacity (non-viability) to respond to the issues in the South Caucasus that are within CSTO statutory objectives, highly likely will not change. We assess it as unlikely that, in 2025, the reasons why Armenia froze its membership will change. Based on this, we assess that the prestige of this organization will remain significantly questioned and a ‘food for thought’ for other member states.” Finally, the section on “Critical Infrastructures” mentions that cyber attacks on Armenia’s critical infrastructures and defense capabilities will pose a major challenge in 2025.

The second chapter, titled “Economic Risks and Opportunities,” states that Armenia’s economic and logistical dependence on external factors will likely continue in 2025 and be “used as a tool of political influence.” Some neighboring countries may use this as leverage to interfere in Armenia’s domestic affairs and attempt to shape the domestic political narrative. This is why diversifying economic dependencies is crucial for economic development.

Meanwhile, the unblocking of trade routes reflected in Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” project is another important milestone for regional peace and stability, according to the report, which further states that economic sanctions on Russia and Iran may hinder Armenia’s supply lines and negatively impact its economy. When it comes to energy security, it argues that, similar to economic dependence, energy dependence is “a widely-used tool of political influence both in global and regional relations, from which Armenia is not shielded.”

The third chapter is dedicated to “Information Risks” and mainly discusses the hybrid pressure and covert propaganda exercised on Armenia by some external actors “importing discourses against Armenia’s interests.”

The report warns citizens not to fall into the trap of fake news or social media platforms that aim to undermine Armenia’s democratic system and internal security and damage its reputation in international forums. In 2024, “the most dangerous actions against the state interests of Armenia included attempts by external actors to recruit Armenian citizens and the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians for the purposes of destabilizing the country, inciting violence and overthrowing the constitutional order of Armenia. This included organization, as well as psychological, ideological and combat preparation, which we assess as an aggressive operation conducted by foreign special services [indirectly hinting at Russia] against Armenia’s interests.”

The report forecasts that, in 2025, Armenia will continue to face hybrid pressure and actions are needed to increase Armenia’s resilience in combating hybrid warfare.

Finally, the last chapter is dedicated to “Combating International Terrorism.” It calls for additional cooperation between intelligence services to combat terrorism.

Reflections 

Bearing in mind that this report is for the general public, we should assume that some of its contents are classified and omitted from the final analysis. A detailed analysis was likely provided and circulated between institutions to make a clear assessment of the current situation and forecast scenario-based analysis to identify emerging risks. The U.S.-based RAND Corporation argues that intelligence analysis is a process of collecting information from the opponent in order to provide critical answers about current issues or predict future behavior. There is a lot of literature adopting different methods for intelligence analysis. However, the information provided by the FIS is descriptive and lacks deep analysis, while it does forecast future scenarios, which is crucial to intelligence analysis.

It would have been useful if the report had provided basic additional suggestions (without providing details) on tackling some of the risks and challenges.

  • The Diaspora is completely ignored in this report, despite the threats and uncertainty facing Armenian communities in the Middle East. The tasks of the FIS include assessing the threats around these communities in order to understand the sources and trajectories of the external threats attempting to destabilize Armenia.

First, the Diaspora is completely ignored in this report, despite the threats and uncertainty facing Armenian communities in the Middle East. The tasks of the FIS include assessing the threats around these communities in order to understand the sources and trajectories of the external threats attempting to destabilize Armenia. The main regional and extra-regional actors in the Middle East also shape politics in the South Caucasus. To combat the information hybrid warfare against Armenia, Diaspora institutions have a huge task to play (irrespective of the internal politics in Armenia). This should be taken into consideration in the future. Any threat against Armenia is also a threat to the Diaspora and Armenian communities in neighboring countries.

Second, it is difficult to judge on what basis the report argues that a “large-scale attack on Armenia by the Azerbaijani side is not assessed as high,” despite the continuous threats coming from Azerbaijani officials. Any instability in Iran would jeopardize the balance in the South Caucasus and expose Armenia’s political and logistic vulnerability against Azerbaijan. When it comes to cybersecurity, the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas should be well-examined, especially how artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber intelligence were used to hack communication means.

Third, when it comes to economic and information risks, it would have been useful if the report had also analyzed the role of quasi-think tanks and certain lobbyist groups in neighboring countries aiming to spread fake reports to threaten Armenia’s image. Some suggestions on policies to counter these activities would have been helpful. Given the revisionist narrative deployed by the ruling party in Armenia to reshape the previous policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh, it would have been useful to mention that such policies would cause internal instability and societal polarization.

Finally, the last chapter caught my surprise given the simplicity of the description, even though global terrorism is one of the main challenges in international relations. The presence of jihadi fighters from the North Caucasus and Central Asia in the Middle East (given the deployment of these fighters during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war by Turkey and Azerbaijan) is a threat to Armenia. Yerevan needs to engage with international and regional actors to prevent their resurgence back into the region.

 

Yeghia Tashjian

Yeghia Tashjian is the Issam Fares Institute Public Policy and International Affairs-American University of Beirut’s Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator. He holds a master’s degree in Public Policy and International Affairs from the American University of Beirut and completed the “Strategic Leadership in Global Societal Security Program” at the Swedish Defense University in 2022.

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